South Korea's export control system by Lee, Jaewon




w Although South Korea began 
to establish its export control 
system in the 1980s, conflicting 
domestic and international 
pressures meant that it was not 
fully implemented. Today, 
South Korea—now a major 
player in the global market and 
a major producer of dual-use 
items—has successfully 
implemented and is further 
improving its export control 
system. The rationale for South 
Korea’s commitment to export 
control derives from a view that 
compliance with multilateral 
export control norms and 
regulations is essential to 
protect trading companies so 
that they can avoid risks of 
illegal exports, and thus 
promote exports.
There are three licensing 
authorities, each issuing export 
licences for different categories 
of strategic item. A public notice 
listing the items subject to 
export control is updated 
annually to reflect changes in 
the control lists of the 
multilateral export control 
regimes. 
South Korea’s 
implementation of export 
controls has accelerated since 
2007. The establishment of the 
Korea Strategic Trade Institute 
(KOSTI) is an example of how a 
government can facilitate 
implementation of export 
controls by raising awareness 
among exporting companies 
and by assisting the companies 




A wide range of trading activities—including export, brokering, transit and 
trans-shipment—can now be exploited as procurement methods by those 
attempting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 
contemporary debate about international efforts to prevent proliferation by 
controlling exports of dual-use items—that is, goods and technologies that 
can be used for both civil and military purposes—much focus is put on this 
wide range, and on the increasing number of countries that are exposed 
to potential abuse of the new methods of procurement and are required to 
establish and enhance export control policies. Asserting control over the 
expanded scope of activities was also emphasized in United Nations Secur-
ity Council Resolution 1540 of 2004, which imposed binding obligations on 
UN member states to establish national export control regulations.1
Yet the emergence of new suppliers of dual-use items and the subsequent 
establishment of export control systems is not a new phenomenon. In the 
1980s, although no international obligation existed to introduce domestic 
measures, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) established export 
control policies. South Korea has an export-oriented economy, and its 
government implements export controls to assist the international trade of 
South Korean companies, while preventing illegal export of strategic items 
to avoid companies breaching the guidelines of the multilateral export 
control regimes.
South Korea is a major producer of strategic items and serves as a global 
trans-shipment point. The value of its exports of all types of goods increased 
from $162.4 billion in 2002 to $547.8 billion in 2012, and it rose from 12th to 
seventh largest exporter of merchandise.2 The South Korean Government 
is also investing in its arms industry in a global market: the value of South 
Korean arms exports grew from $241 million in 2003 to $2.35 billion in 2012 
1 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 Apr. 2004. Prior to the adoption of Resolution 1540, 
UN arms embargoes also imposed indirect obligations on UN member states, requiring controls 
of arms exports. On arms export regulations in the early 1990s see Anthony, I. (ed.), SIPRI, Arms 
Export Regulations (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991). 
2 World Trade Organization, Statistics database, ‘Time series on international trade’, <http://stat.
wto.org/>. 
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while the number of South Korean companies exporting arms increased 
from 10 in 2008 to 36 in 2011.3 The South Korea port of Busan ranks among 
the top 20 ‘mega ports’.4 In short, South Korea is a significant exporter, and 
so must be a significant actor in non-proliferation export controls. 
This paper describes the establishment and recent development of the 
South Korean export control system, focusing on controls on WMD-related 
dual-use items.5 It continues in section II with a description of the initial 
establishment and subsequent development of export control 
regulations in the context of national security policy and eco-
nomic interests. Section III describes the legal structure and 
lists of controlled items. The types of licence and the functions 
of licensing agencies are introduced in section IV. Section V 
deals with enforcement issues, including the functions of customs author-
ities and prosecutors. The paper concludes in section VI. 
II. The development of export controls in South Korea
From the cold war to the 1990s
Beginning in the early 1950s, industrialized Western countries formulated 
restrictive measures to control exports of military and dual-use items to the 
Communist bloc, with the United States taking a leading role. The efforts 
were realized with the establishment of the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Control (COCOM).6 
Japan was the only Asian country to participate. COCOM had little concern 
with exports from other Asian countries such as South Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan because they were not capable of producing commodities that 
were controlled under the regime. In the case of South Korea, where little 
industrial capacity remained after the devastating 1950–53 Korean War, 
companies were not capable of producing dual-use items and the country’s 
exports mostly consisted of agricultural, fishery and mineral products.7 
Moreover, South Korea had no political will to trade with the Communist 
3 Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), [Current status of exported defence 
industry materials], <http://www.dapa.go.kr/internet/information/statistics/list_statistics.jsp?
mode=readForm&boardCode=BDDAPA92&curPage=1&searchField=TITLE&searchWord=&artic
leSeq=11670> (in Korean); and Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), [2012 
KIET white paper on defence industry statistics and its competitiveness] (KIET: Seoul, 21 June 
2013) (in Korean), p. 24. On arms-producing companies in South Korea see also Jackson, S. T., ‘Arms 
production’, SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2011), pp. 240–44.
4 Jones, S., Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Regional 
Response (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, 2004), p. 2.
5 Dual-use items can be categorized into conventional and WMD uses. All nuclear items from 
the NSG trigger lists—including items with a solely nuclear use—are dual-use items from the 
perspective of export control, since they have both military and civilian uses. On these concepts 
and their overlap see Bauer, S., ‘Arms trade control capacity building: lessons from dual-use trade 
controls’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2013/2, Mar. 2013, <http://books.sipri.org/
product_info?c_product_id=454>.
6 On the implications of COCOM for the current multilateral export control regime see Anthony, I. 
and Bauer, S., ‘Transfer controls’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006).
7 Frank, C. R., Kim, K. and Westphal, L. E., ‘Economic growth in South Korea since World War II’, 
eds C. R. Frank, K. Kim and L. E. Westphal, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: South 
Korea (National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA, 1975).
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bloc; enmity with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or 
North Korea) left little opportunity for any form of exchange. 
In the late 1980s a mixture of international and domestic political dynamics 
produced ambiguity in South Korea’s export control policy. On the one hand, 
a new South Korean policy emerged that emphasized political and economic 
relations with Communist countries, and South Korean com panies increas-
ingly demanded economic engagement with them. South Korea achieved 
rapid economic growth driven by export-oriented industrialization and 
sought new markets in China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.8 On the 
other hand, this ambitious approach was seen as a challenge to the US-led 
effort to exert more pressure to contain the declining economies of the Com-
munist bloc. Moreover, by this time South Korean companies had reached a 
level of technological development that allowed them to produce goods (e.g. 
computers with 16-bit processors) that were controlled under COCOM. The 
USA thus approached South Korea on a bilateral basis to 
ask it to comply with the COCOM guidelines in order to 
avoid a weakening of the effect of the existing multilateral 
containment policy. 
In 1987 South Korea and the USA signed an agreement ‘to 
preclude the unauthorized transfer of such com mod ities 
and technical data to proscribed communist destinations’.9 In return for 
the establishment of a comprehensive export control system, South Korea 
was granted preferential licensing benefits by the US Government.10 The 
agreement thus served as a cornerstone for South Korea’s establishment of 
export control regulations.
The South Korean Government made slow progress in implementing the 
agreement. As a partial implementation, South Korea established a system 
to issue COCOM-style ‘import certificate/delivery verification’ (IC/DV) 
documents by issuing a presidential decree in 1987 under the Foreign Trade 
Act.11 However, the South Korean Government only started to operate the 
IC/DV system in 1990.12 In 1992 South Korea amended the Foreign Trade Act 
to include an additional sub-chapter authorizing the Minister of Commerce 
8 On the new policy toward the Communist countries see Kim, H., ‘The Republic of Korea’s 
northern policy: origin, development, and prospects’, Japan Review of International Affairs, vol. 5, 
special issue (1991). On implications of the policy for export controls see Park, H. S., ‘South Korea’s 
export control policy’, eds G. K. Bertsch, R. T. Cupitt and S. Elliott-Gower, International Cooperation 
on Nonproliferation Export Controls: Prospects for the 1990s and Beyond (University of Michigan 
Press: Ann Arbor, MI, 1994).
9 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the 
Government of the United States of America on the Protection of Strategic Commodities and 
Technical Data, signed 11 Sep. 1987, entered into force 11 May 1989, <http://www.law.go.kr/trty 
InfoPWah.do?trtySeq=1520&chrClsCd=010203>.
10 US Government, ‘Korean export control development: continued relevance of export 
controls’, Cable on US–South Korean Export Control/Nonproliferation Talks, Honolulu, 7–9 June 
1993, Declassified Documents Reference System, <http://gdc.gale.com/products/declassified-
documents-reference-system/>. According to the declassified cable, South Korea was granted 
2 licensing benefits, but the details are not provided. On US licensing benefits to 3rd countries see 
Sheen, S., ‘Trade, technology and security: U.S. bilateral export-control negotiations with South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Australia’, PhD dissertation, Tufts University, Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, 2001, p. 135.
11 Presidential Decree no. 12 191 on the Foreign Trade Act, 30 June 1987, <http://www.law.go.kr/
lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=18881> (in Korean), Article 27.
12 [Import management for strategic items], Hankyoreh, 13 June 1990 (in Korean).
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to require permits for export of strategic items.13 It was only in 1993 that the 
South Korean Government announced a concrete plan to set up a legal and 
organizational framework for licensing authorities.14
In the 1990s the USA came to consider export controls, which were no 
longer needed as part of a containment policy against Communist countries, 
as necessary for non-proliferation purposes. The USA was concerned that 
the new post-cold war order would weaken the impetus for South Korea 
to continue to implement export controls.15 However, the South Korean 
Government had a keen interest in continuing export controls as part of its 
containment policy against North Korea. South Korea also had concerns 
about those former Communist countries that maintained relations with 
North Korea. When it came to relations with North Korea, there was no pos-
sibility for military security to compromise with economic interests.16
South Korea’s national security interests were projected at the international 
level as a political commitment to the non-proliferation of strategic items, 
which led to South Korea becoming one of the original participants in the 
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-use Goods and Technologies in 1996.17 Participation was 
possible because of South Korea’s normative approach to non-
proliferation, its achievement of a certain level of production 
capabilities and enactment of the export control regulations 
required by the Wassenaar Arrangement.18 South Korea also 
joined the other multilateral export control regimes: the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1995, the Australia Group 
in 1996 and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2001. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004, which obliges all UN member 
states to establish measures to control the risk of proliferation of WMD and 
their means of delivery, further stimulated the development of South Korea’s 
export controls. 
Recent developments
South Korea has facilitated the implementation of export controls, with 
agencies such as the South Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy 
(MOTIE) assisting companies in order to enhance the country’s competitive-
ness on the global market. For example, MOTIE has helped prepare export-
ing companies for the increasing demands of enhanced export controls.19 
As a result, the Foreign Trade Act was amended in September 2003 to 
create an online system, subsequently named Yestrade, for the management 
13 Foreign Trade Act, Law no. 4527 as amended up to 8 Dec. 1992, <http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.
do?lsiSeq=5134&ancYd=19921208&ancNo=04527&efYd=19930701&nwJoYnInfo=N&efGubun=Y&
chrClsCd=010202> (in Korean), Article 24.3.
14 Sheen (note 10), pp. 147–61.
15 See US Government (note 10).
16 On South Korea’s perception of North Korea and its understanding of the necessity of export 
controls see Park (note 8).
17 On the Wassenaar Arrangement as a successor of COCOM see Anthony and Bauer (note 6).
18 Wassenaar Arrangement, ‘Guidelines & procedures, including the Initial Elements’, Dec. 2011, 
<http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/>, Appendix 4.
19 Shim, S., [A study on the efficient implementation system of Korean export control], 
PhD dissertation, Sungkyunkwan University, 2010, <http://www.riss.kr/link?id=T12150031> (in 
Korean), pp. 160–62.
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of strategic items (see section IV below).20 In 2007 the Foreign Trade Act 
was fully amended and export controls on strategic items were strengthened 
more generally.21 For example, the Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI) 
was established to support the implementation of export controls, including 
activities such as identification services (see box 1 below).
The South Korean Government has continuously amended its provisions 
on export control in order to reflect changes in the multilateral export control 
regimes and has developed ever more sophisticated legal 
instruments, always bearing in mind the need for a bal-
ance between export promotion and non-proliferation.22 
Between 2004 and February 2013 the Public Notice on 
Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies—which lists 
the items subject to export control—was amended 15 times. Until 2009 the 
list was updated irregularly; since then, the authorities have updated it at 
the end of each year to reflect changes in the control lists of the multi lateral 
export control regimes.23 While most of the amendments to the Public 
Notice have dealt with the annual updates to the lists of the four regimes, 
provisions for transit and trans-shipment and brokering licences have also 
been added. In addition, exceptions have been added to the ‘catch-all’ clause, 
which requires exporters to obtain export permits for items not mentioned 
in control lists but which may be intended for use in a WMD programme 
(known as unlisted items).
In addition, the Denial List—which lists end-users for whom the exporters 
are requested to contact the licensing authorities to obtain catch-all 
licences—has been reduced from around 7000 to around 600 individuals and 
companies.24 The larger Denial List was based on lists from the UN Security 
Council’s lists of denied parties and the four export control regimes’ licence 
denials. The shorter amended list now follows the UN Security Council’s 
designation (see section IV below). The South Korean Government has not 
required the import of dual-use items to be reported since November 2009.
A further amendment to the Foreign Trade Act was passed in 2013 and is 
expected to come into force on 31 January 2014.25 The amendment makes 
several changes to support legal trade flows. For example, it implements 
a plan of the South Korean Government to provide identification services 
regarding catch-all clauses, so that a company can reduce the risk of an 
illegal export caused by its subjective judgement on identification of items 
to be exported (see box 1 below). MOTIE and KOSTI have not yet provided 
specific information on how the service will operate.
20 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI), [Annual report 2008] (KOSTI: Seoul, 2008) (in 
Korean), p. 5.
21 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (note 20).
22 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI), [Annual report 2012] (KOSTI: Seoul, 2012) (in 
Korean).
23 Yestrade, [System overview], <http://www.yestrade.go.kr/portl/html/sl/sposl100.jsp> (in 
Korean).
24 Yestrade, [Denial list], <http://www.yestrade.go.kr/portl/jsp/si/sposi050lf.jsp> (in Korean).
25 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (note 22), p. 90.
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III. Legal structure and control lists
Four pieces of primary legislation form the basis of the current export 
control system in South Korea: the Foreign Trade Act, the Defense Acqui-
sition Program Act, the Nuclear Safety Act, and the Act on the Control of 
the Manu facture, Export and Import of Specific Chemicals and Chemical 
Agents for the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Prohibi-
tion of Chemical and Biological Weapons Act).26 While each of these laws 
regulates a different type of item, the Foreign Trade Act serves as the main 
pillar of South Korean export controls. It regulates who issues 
export permits and how the licensing procedure should be 
conducted. For example, Article 11 of the Prohibition of Chem-
ical and Biological Weapons Act requires exporters to obtain 
export licences in accordance with articles 19 and 26 of the 
Foreign Trade Act, while Article 57(2) of the Defense Acquisition Program 
Act requires anyone who plans to export military items to obtain licences 
from either the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy (in line with the 
Foreign Trade Act) or the commissioner of the Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration (DAPA).
A single implementation system applies to all four laws, based on Article 
19 of the Foreign Trade Act and its Public Notice on Trade of Strategic 
Goods and Technologies.27 Article 19(2) of the Foreign Trade Act states that 
anyone who exports ‘strategic items’ must obtain an export licence from 
either the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy or the head of the relevant 
adminis trative agency.28 ‘Strategic items’ which require export permits are 
designated by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy in consultation 
with the heads of the relevant administrative agencies, and published in the 
Public Notice.29 The Public Notice also specifies the process for preparing 
and submitting a licensing application and contains two control lists of 
items.30
Control lists of strategic items
Strategic items are listed in annexes 2 and 3 of the Public Notice. Export of 
the items in these two lists is subject to control under the four export con-
26 Foreign Trade Act, Law no. 11 873 as amended up to 7 June 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.
do?lsiSeq=141071&efYd=20130701> (in Korean); Defense Acquisition Program Act, Law no. 11 713 as 
amended up to 23 Mar. 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=137319&efYd=20130323> (in 
Korean); Nuclear Safety Act, Law no. 11 715 as amended up to 23 Mar. 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/
lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=137336&efYd=20130323> (in Korean); and Act on the Control of the Manufacture, 
Export and Import of Specific Chemicals and Chemical Agents for the Prohibition of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons (Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons Act), Law no. 11 690 as 
amended up to 23 Mar. 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=137009&efYd=20130323> 
(in Korean).
In addition, transactions with North Korea are regulated by the Ministry of Unification, under the 
Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act. Transactions with North Korea are not recognized as 
import or export; instead, the terms ‘taking in’ and ‘taking out’ are used.
27 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies, Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy Notice no. 2013-39, 31 Mar. 2013, <http://law.go.kr/admRulInfoP.do?admRulSeq=2000000
023976&chrClsCd=010201> (in Korean), Article 1.2.
28 For details of the relevant administrative agencies see section IV below.
29 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 26
30 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (note 20), p. 5
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trol laws.31 In Annex 4 of the Public Notice, the South Korean Government 
provides a table that categorizes such items under the four export control 
regimes and two international treaties—the Wassenaar Arrangement, the 
MTCR, the NSG and the Australia Group and the 1972 Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC).32 
Annex 2 lists dual-use items, including items from the NSG trigger list 
with a solely nuclear use. Annex 3 lists conventional munitions (identical to 
the Wassenaar Arrangement munitions list). These new control lists came 
into effect in 2008; previously, South Korea had maintained separate con-
trol lists for each export control regime.33 Items in the list are assigned a 
five-character alphanumeric code; the fourth (alphabetic) character and the 
fifth (numeric) character represent the category of the items; and the third 
(numeric) character indicates the relevant export control regime.34 South 
Korea’s current coding method is thus similar to that used in the European 
Union (EU) list of dual-use items (which is based on the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment control list system) and to the Export Control Classification Number 
(ECCN) used in the US Commerce Control List, a list of items controlled 
under US export regulations.35
The annexes are frequently updated to reflect changes in the lists of the 
four multilateral regimes; amendments are issued through a notification 
from the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, in consultation with the 
head of relevant administrative agencies.36 The South Korean lists include 
two items in addition to the items listed by the regimes: severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus and bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) agent.
Defence industry materials
In addition to the conventional arms listed in Annex 3, the South Korean 
Government maintains another list for munitions, defined as ‘defence indus-
try materials’ by the Defense Acquisition Program Act. Although the concept 
of the Annex 3 munitions list and defence industry materials differ, since the 
31 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Article 1.2
32 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Annex 4 (controlled 
items categorized by the multilateral export control regimes and treaties); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC), 
opened for signature 10 Apr. 1972, entered into force 26 Mar. 1975, United Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. 1015 (1976); and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC), 
opened for signature 13 Jan. 1993, entered into force 29 Apr. 1997, <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
CTCTreaties.aspx?id=26>.
33 Shim (note 19), p. 87
34 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI) and Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and 
Control (KINAC), [Atomic export control guide] (KOSTI/KINAC: Seoul, Nov. 2011), <https://www.
kosti.or.kr/kosti/downLoadAction.do?fileName=1849> (in Korean), p. 13.
35 Council Regulation (EC) no 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering, and transit of dual-use items, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L134, 29 May 2009; and US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, 
‘Export Control Classification Number (ECCN)’, <http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/licensing/
commerce-control-list-classification/export-control-classification-number-eccn>.
36 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 19(1).
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two laws control the weapons according to different criteria, most defence 
industry materials are included in the list of ‘strategic items’ in Annex 3.
Defence industry materials are defined to be ‘weapons systems’ that are 
designated by the commissioner of DAPA in consultation with the Minister 
of Trade, Industry and Energy as being ‘necessary for the securing of stable 
source of procurement, strict quality assurance, etc.’—that is, items whose 
export needs to controlled in order to secure a stable supply of high-quality 
arms for the South Korean Government.37 Defence industry materials are 
divided into two groups: major items and general items. The Defense Acqui-
sition Program Act designates 12 types of major defence industry item.38 All 
other defence industry materials are general defence industry materials.39 
The commissioner of DAPA, in consultation with the Minister of Trade, 
Industry and Energy, is responsible for designation of contractors and classi-
fi cation of the products into categories.40
In summary, the South Korean Government largely regulates three types 
of controlled item: dual-use, munitions and exclusively nuclear items (see 
table 1). Among these, munitions include two subcategories: general defence 
industry materials and major defence industry materials. However, there 
could be conflicting definitions of the munitions list (Annex 3) and ‘defence 
industry materials’, which would affect the identification and licensing 
37 Defense Acquisition Program Act (note 26), Article 34.
38 These 12 categories are: (a) firearms and other fire power weapons; (b) guided weapons; 
(c) aircraft; (d) vessels; (e) ammunition; ( f ) tanks, armoured vehicles and other mobile combat 
equipment; (g) radars, friend or foe identification devices, and other communication and 
electronic equipment; (h) night observation devices and other optical or thermal imaging devices; 
(i) combat engineering equipment; ( j) chemical, biological and radiological warfare equipment; 
(k) command and control systems; (l) other materials that the head of the Defense Acquisition 
Program Administration designates as recognized to be important for military strategy or tactical 
operations. Defense Acquisition Program Act (note 26), Article 35(2).
39 Presidential Decree no. 24 442 on the Defense Acquisition Program Act, 23 Mar. 2013, <http://
www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=136012> (in Korean), Article 39(2).
40 Defense Acquisition Program Act (note 26), Article 34.1.
Table 1. South Korea’s export control system







Combined list from the Public 




Annex 3 (Munitions 
List)
Annex 3 (Munitions 
List)
Annex 2, Category 10
Identification service provider KOSTI –a –a KINAC
Licensing authority MOTIE MOTIE DAPA NSSC








Promotion Service,  
www.neps.go.kr
DAPA = Defense Acquisition Program Administration; KINAC = Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control; KOSTI = 
Korea Strategic Trade Institute; MOTIE = Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; NSSC = Nuclear Safety and Security Commis-
sion.
a Companies producing military materials need a designation as a contractor by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, who 
is obliged by the Defense Acquisition Program Act to consult with DAPA. Identification in the export control process is thus not 
necessary.
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process. Nonetheless, the three licensing authorities have a clear division of 
roles for issuing export permits for controlled items (see below).
IV. Licensing
Major agencies
There are three licensing authorities in South Korea’s export control system, 
each issuing export licences for different categories of strategic item: the 
Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, the commissioner 
of DAPA and the head of the Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission (NSSC).41
The export of dual-use items listed in categories 1–9 of 
Annex 2 and general defence industry materials found in 
Annex 3 (the munitions list) requires a licence from the Minister of Trade, 
Industry and Energy. Licence appli cation documents can be submitted via 
Yestrade, the online national export controls system developed by MOTIE 
and KOSTI.42 
Export of major defence industry materials found in Annex 3 and any 
dual-use item in Annex 2 where the importer intends to use it for a military 
purpose requires a licence from the commissioner of DAPA.43 Exports of 
dual-use items with a solely nuclear use in category 10 of Annex 2 require 
licences from the head of the NSSC.44 
Inter-agency coordination is provided by the Council for Control of 
Exportation and Importation of Strategic Items. Meetings of the council 
can be organized by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy and the 
heads of relevant administrative agencies—that is, the NSSC, the Ministry 
of Unification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National 
Defense—for consultation among the organizations.45 The Council may 
request the intelligence, investigation or prosecution agencies—the National 
Intelligence Service, the Prosecution Service, the Korean National Police 
Agency, and the Defense Security Command—to conduct an investigation or 
render assistance, if necessary, for any items on its agenda.
Identification services—that is, identification of which items are subject 
to export control—are provided by three agencies. KOSTI provides identifi-
cation services for dual-use items (see box 1). Identification services for the 
trigger list items (Annex 2, Category 10) are provided by the Korea Institute 
of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) on behalf of the NSSC. 
DAPA provides identification services within its department. All three agen-
cies provide the services via the webpages mentioned above. 
41 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Article 4
42 Yestrade, <http://www.yestrade.go.kr/>.
43 Applications can be submitted online via the Defense Trade Service website, <http://www.
d4b.go.kr/>.
44 Applications can be submitted online via the Nuclear Export Promotion Service website, 
<http://www.neps.go.kr/>.
45 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 30; and Presidential Decree no. 24 442 on the Foreign 
Trade Act, 23 Mar. 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=136012&efYd=20130323> (in 
Korean), Article 47. 
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Groupings of destinations
The licensing authorities divide importing countries into two groups.46 
Group A consists of those countries that have joined the four multilateral 
export control regimes and are parties to the CWC and the BTWC.47 Group 
B consists of all other countries. 
Exporters trading with end-users in Group A are exempted from 
submitting certain documents such as an export letter of credit, an end-user 
certificate and exporter’s written oath.48. In addition, for export of unlisted 
46 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Annex 6.
47 Presidential Decree of the Foreign Trade Act (note 45), Article 32.
48 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), articles 20, 21.
Box 1. KOSTI and identification services
In general, before a company applies for an export licence, it must identify whether the item for export is classified as a dual-use 
item. However, many companies do not have in-house capacity to conduct this identification process, are reluctant to hire techni-
cal and legal experts on export control, are unaware of export controls or do not have financial resources to operate an internal 
compliance programme. To address these issues, a government can establish an institution to assist companies in complying 
with export control regulations, and in particular to provide ‘identification services’. The establishment process of the Korea 
Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI) is a good example of the role that a government can play in increasing awareness of export 
controls and providing identification services.a
Beginning in 2003 the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) reviewed the implementation of South Korea’s export 
controls, including the awareness of strategic items among the South Korean business community, and as a result introduced an 
Establishment Plan for the Trade Control System of Strategic Items.b According to Shim Soung-kun, the first head of KOSTI, 
who previously worked at MOTIE, the South Korean Government recognized that the country’s economic growth could be 
hampered if export controls were not implemented effectively. It was also emphasized that South Korean companies that did not 
comply with export controls would be mentioned in denial notifications within the multilateral export control regimes and so 
denied international transactions.
The government considered the idea that each private company could conduct its own identification service, but this soon 
turned out to be an unrealistic option. The capacity of the business sector to implement export controls was limited because 
there were few experts in South Korea. In addition, companies were reluctant to allocate financial resources to invest in an 
internal compliance programme. According to Shim, in a survey conducted by MOTIE of 80 executives of leading South Korean 
trading companies, only 3 or 4 answered that they knew about the concept of strategic items. Moreover, the executives col-
lectively rejected the idea of hiring personnel for internal export control compliance.c
To achieve efficient implementation of national export controls by reaching out to the business community and the public, 
MOTIE established KOSTI in 2007. KOSTI plays a leading role in facilitating national export controls. In addition to identifica-
tion services, it also provides educational service (including outreach activities) for the business sector and the public in order to 
facilitate implementation of national export controls. Exporters can check whether the items are on the list using the Yestrade 
online system, either through the use of parameter sheets or by applying for an institutional evaluation. KOSTI also provides 
educational courses for companies, the government and the academic community. For companies, KOSTI provides regular 
courses on export control regulations and the use of Yestrade. It offers courses on the identification of strategic items for police 
and customs officers. In 2012 KOSTI started a programme for college and graduate students who are studying in relevant fields, 
such as engineering.
a Although KOSTI’s official English name includes the term ‘strategic trade’, a direct translation of its name would be Korea Strategic Items 
Management Institute. The term ‘strategic trade’ is not commonly used in Korean.
b Shim, S., [A study on the efficient implementation system of Korean export control], PhD dissertation, Sungkyunkwan University, 2010, 
<http://www.riss.kr/link?id=T12150031> (in Korean), pp. 162–63.
c Shim (note b).
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items to countries in Group B more criteria apply for a situational licence 
(defined below).49
Types of licence
The Foreign Trade Act categorizes licences as ‘export licences’, ‘situational 
licences’ (also known as ‘catch-all licences’), ‘transit and trans-shipment 
licences’ or ‘brokering licences’.50 Each licence is issued by the organization 
responsible for the designated items except for situational licences, which 
MOTIE issues. 
An export licence is a general form of licence for strategic items exported 
from South Korea. It can be an individual export licence or a comprehensive 
export licence. Comprehensive licences are issued after MOTIE certifies 
that a company has incorporated an internal compliance programme into 
its business operations that allows it to abide by export control regu lations. 
A comprehensive export licence permits exports of certain items without an 
individual licence for a given period of time when deemed not to undermine 
international peace and security.51 According to the Annex 8 of the Public 
Notice, special comprehensive licences are not applicable for solely nuclear 
items in Annex 2, munitions in Annex 3, items in the ‘Very sensitive list’ in 
Annex 2 and items in MTCR category I.52 There are general comprehensive 
licenses and special comprehensive licenses. The former applies to the 
countries in group A, and the latter applies to the countries in group B. 
An exporter is required to obtain a situational licence if it becomes 
aware—from the government or directly—that the importer intends to use 
an exported item, which is not listed as a ‘strategic item’, in the manu fac-
turing, developing, using or storing of WMD or their delivery system (i.e. 
if it falls under the catch-all clauses).53 Catch-all clauses in 
the South Korean legislation focus on potential misuse in 
WMD programmes; this contrasts with, for example, EU 
regulations, which cover a broader range of military end-
use.54 The catch-all clauses include suspect elements. For 
example, before applying for a situational licence, exporters should consider 
12 cautionary situations listed in the Foreign Trade Act, the list of designated 
entities and individuals based on UN Security Council sanctions (the Denial 
List), and other items designated in Annex 2(2) of the Public Notice.55 The 
12 situations are similar to ‘red flag’ conditions.56
49 Articles of the Public Notice that deal with groupings of destination are those clauses on 
exceptions of documentations and on situational, brokering and special comprehensive licences. 
Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), articles 21, 29, 30, 31, 39, 42.
50 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), articles 19(2), 19(3), 23(3), 24.
51 Yestrade, ‘Licensing’, <http://www.yestrade.go.kr/portl/html/eng/sub03/s03_3.jsp>.
52 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Annex 8.
53 MOTIE uses the term ‘items subject to the situational licence’ to describe unlisted items with 
potential licence requirements.
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering, transit of dual-use items, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L134, 29 May 2009.
55 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 19(3); Yestrade (note 24); and Public Notice on Trade of 
Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Annex 2(2). 
56 ‘Export control, Seoul-style’, WorldECR, Dec. 2012, <http://www.worldecr.com/archives/
export-control-seoul-style/>
Catch-all clauses in the South Korean 
legislation focus on potential misuse in 
WMD programmes
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Since many conditions, with different perspectives, apply to export con-
trols on unlisted items, MOTIE provides an implementation process for 
catch-all clauses on Yestrade. When an item of concern is identified as not 
listed in the Public Notice, exporters are asked to answer the following four 
questions to see if the item, end-use and certain circumstances require a 
situational licence. 
1. Is the importer or the end-user on the Denial List (searched via Yes-
trade)? 
2. Does the item and its destination appear in Annex 2(2)?57
3. Is a diversion of end-use perceived?
4. Is the destination of the item a Group B country and does a situation 
listed in articles 39(1)1–12 of the Public Notice apply (see box 2)?
If the answer to any of these questions is yes, the exporter is required to 
apply for a situational licence. 
A transit and trans-shipment licence is required by anyone who is to transit 
or trans-ship strategic items or items subject to a situational licence through 
South Korean harbours or airports. ‘Trans-shipment’ is defined as moving 
and loading goods from an arriving means of transport to another departing 
means of transport within the same customs jurisdiction.58
For brokering licences, only strategic items (or listed items) are subject 
to control; in other words, the South Korean Government does not apply a 
catch-all clause to brokering licences. The Public Notice defines ‘brokering’ 
as any action conducted by any South Korean who is residing in South Korea 
(including legal persons established according to domestic laws) to transfer 
strategic items from one foreign country to another, when the transactions 
57 Twenty-one situations are described in Annex 2(2) (items with specific details and destination 
country). E.g. export to Syria of a fume hood more than 2.5 meters wide requires a situational licence.
58 Special Notice on Trans-shipment Freight Management Process, Customs Notice no. 2013-48, 
10 June 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/admRulLsInfoP.do?admRulSeq=2000000093765> (in 
Korean), Article 2(1).
Box 2. Situations listed in the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies
1. The importer is reluctant to provide information on the end-use of the item.
2. The item to be exported does not fit the end-user’s line of business.
3. There is a significant gap between the item’s capacity and the importing country’s level of technology.
4. The end-user has no business experience in which the item could be used.
5. The end-user does not have the required technical knowledge about the export of the item.
6. The end-user declines installation, maintenance or educational training services for the item.
7. The ultimate consignee of the item is a forwarding agent.
8. The price and payment conditions for the item are outside the normal range.
9. The delivery dates for the item are outside the normal period.
10. The shipping route of the item is abnormal.
11. It is unclear whether the item will be used in the importing country or re-exported.
12. The information about the item or a destination is requested with abnormal security standards.
Source: Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy Notice no. 2013 39, 
31 Mar. 2013, <http://law.go.kr/admRulInfoP.do?admRulSeq=2000000023976&chrClsCd=010201> (in Korean), article 39(1)1–12.
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involve contracts for trade or other forms of transaction (including free 
transfer) with payment of commission or other compensation.59
The Public Notice also regulates re-export of strategic items.60 Re-export 
is defined as the export of an imported strategic item in its original form or 
of manufactured or processed goods that incorporate imported strategic 
items (regardless of whether the new goods are strategic).61 If it is a new 
product that is not identified as a strategic item and the value of the imported 
strategic items is less than 25 per cent of the new product or if the imported 
strategic item cannot be separated from the final product without losing its 
original functions, a re-export licence is not required.62
V. Enforcement
Customs authorities
Although the primary function of the Korea Customs Service (KCS) is to 
impose import duties and internal taxes on imported goods and to control 
smuggling, it also conducts surveillance of breaches of the Foreign Trade Act 
in support of national export controls. According to the KCS’s Public Notice 
on Export and Import Customs Clearance of Strategic Items (the Customs 
Public Notice), an exporter is to report to the head of the customs office after 
obtaining an export licence from the relevant agency.63 The exporter must 
also include the licence number in the document required to be submitted 
during the clearance process, which allows collection of information when 
the exporter reports to the KCS prior to loading.64 In addition, the customs 
automated system, UNI-PASS, is linked with Yestrade, so that information on 
export licences and customs clearance is shared.65 All goods to be exported 
must go through the export customs procedure, although the KCS can omit 
an inspection process for export goods. However, some goods in its export 
process may be examined as part of the agency’s risk-management process.66
In questionable cases, the KCS can demand documents with the strategic 
item’s identification information or export licences relating to the item.67 In 
investigation and surveillance, the customs officers perform their duty as 
judicial police in accordance with the Customs Act.68 The officers can search 
59 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Article 2(3).
60 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Article 37.
61 Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies (note 27), Article 2(9).
62 When the final destination is Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan or Syria, the imported value 
should be less than 10%.
63 Public Notice on Export and Import Customs Clearance of Strategic Items, Customs Notice 
no. 2013-40, 31 May 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/admRulLsInfoP.do?chrClsCd=010202&admRul
Seq=2000000024014> (in Korean), Article 3(1).
64 Public Notice on Export and Import Customs Clearance of Strategic Items (note 63), Article 
3(2).
65 South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) and Korea Strategic Trade Institute 
(KOSTI), Online Export Control System of Korea, Your Export Supporter: Yestrade (MKE/KOSTI: 
Seoul, n.d.), <http://www.yestrade.go.kr/portl/html/eng/down/YesTrade_brochure.pdf>, p. 12.
66 Korea Customs Service, ‘What is export customs?’, <http://www.customs.go.kr/kcshome/
main/content/ContentView.do?contentId=CONTENT_ID_000001336&layoutMenuNo=21056>.
67 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (note 20), p. 10
68 Customs Act, Law no. 11 602 as amended up to 1 Jan. 2013, <http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.
do?lsiSeq=131363>, Article 295
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offenders under the Foreign Trade Act and arrest them at the scene.69 How-
ever, they do not have the right to bring the case to court.
Prosecutions, penalties and administrative measures
On initiation of a legal process, prosecutors have discretion to decide 
whether to bring a case to court, and the right to bring a case to court is solely 
decided by the Prosecutors’ Office. As Anna Wetter argues, ‘in systems that 
grant prosecutorial discretion, it is crucial that prosecutors are convinced of 
the severity of a certain crime, since they may not otherwise choose to refer 
a case to the court’.70 Thus, the South Korean system, where detection by 
customs officers is not sufficient for prosecution, may not provide effective 
law enforcement.71 
In terms of criminal sanctions, the Foreign Trade Act provides two penalty 
provisions for export violations related to strategic items. First, anyone who 
exports items without a licence to facilitate international ‘proliferation’ of 
strategic items faces imprisonment for up to seven years or a fine not exceed-
ing five times the value of the exported or brokered items.72 Second, anyone 
who exports items without a licence or who obtains a licence fraudulently 
faces imprisonment for up to five years or a fine not exceed-
ing three times the value of the exported goods.73 The first of 
these penalties emphasizes specific offences that contributed 
to proliferation of strategic items, while the second is related 
to any unauthorized transaction. The two penalty provisions may not be 
different, because by definition illegal exports facilitate the inter national 
spread of strategic items. Moreover, ‘proliferation’ is normally used in refer-
ence to WMD, not strategic items, in the field of non-proliferation export 
controls.74 The legal expression used in this provision is thus unique. Penal-
ties for crimes of negligence are not specifically mentioned. 
As an example of an enforcement case, in 2011 equipment for the produc-
tion of shells was illegally exported to Myanmar by 14 former and current 
staff members of a South Korean company that produces defence items.75 
The offenders disguised shipments as agricultural machines. They were sen-
tenced to prison terms of 12–18 months, suspended for 2–3 years. They were 
also fined 5–50 million won ($4500–45 000). In another example, between 
2005 and 2008 a company exported around 200 dual-use machine tools 
without the necessary licences to China, India and nine other countries. 
The company was fined 50 million won ($45 000) and one month of export 
restriction.
69 Customs Act (note 68), Article 296
70 Wetter, A., Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-Use Goods, SIPRI Research 
Report no. 24 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009), p. 67.
71 There are few studies regarding effective enforcement of non-proliferation export controls. 
For lessons and challenges from European prosecution cases see Bauer, S., ‘WMD-related dual-use 
trade control offences in the European Union: penalties and prosecutions’, EU Non-Proliferation 
Consortium, Non-proliferation Papers no. 30, July 2013, <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/
activities/activities.php>.
72 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 53(1).
73 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 53(2).
74 The author is grateful to Sibylle Bauer for highlighting this point.
75 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI), [Annual report 2011] (KOSTI: Seoul, 2011), p. 109 (in 
Korean).
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The Foreign Trade Act contains three administrative sanctions. First, 
the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy or the head of a relevant 
administrative agency can ban all exports or imports of strategic items for 
up to three years by a person who has exported any strategic items without 
an export licence or situational licence.76 Second, the Minister of Trade, 
Industry and Energy or the head of a relevant administrative agency may 
issue an ‘educational order’ to take a training course of up to eight hours to 
(a) any person who has exported strategic items without an export licence 
or a situational licence; or (b) any person who obtained an export licence or 
a situational licence by fraud or other wrongful means.77 Third, a civil fine 
not exceeding 20 million won ($18 000) can be imposed on any person who 
has failed to submit a report or data or has submitted a false report or data.78 
In 2011 the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy ordered 21 adminis-
trative measures for violations of the Foreign Trade Act.79 These included 
warnings and educational orders for to 15 companies, export restrictions 
up to two months and fines for 3 companies, and 3 cases where export and 
import restrictions were imposed for up to three months.
VI. Conclusions
Although South Korea began to establish its export control system in the 
late 1980s, the South Korean Government seems to have initially hesitated 
to fully implement the controls. On the one hand, companies that produced 
strategic items and sought new markets demanded that the South Korean 
Government pursue an economic engagement policy with Communist coun-
tries. On the other hand, South Korea, a newly industrialized country, faced 
increasing pressure from the USA to control exports of these items to the 
Communist bloc. 
By the 1990s South Korea’s economic landscape had changed. South Korea 
became a major player in the global market, with a larger share in merchan-
dise trade. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolu-
tion of COCOM contributed to the success of South Korea’s 
engagement policy with the former Communist countries. 
Nonetheless, South Korea maintained tight controls on the 
export of strategic items to North Korea.
Today, the South Korean Government has successfully implemented 
and is further improving its export control system. The rationale for the 
commitment derives from a view that compliance with multi lateral export 
control norms and regulations is essential to protect trading companies, so 
that they can avoid risks of illegal exports, and thus promote exports.
Since South Korea amended its Foreign Trade Act in 2007, the imple-
mentation of export controls has accelerated. The establishment of the 
Yestrade online system has been one of the most important achievements 
in the prompt and effective implementation of the national export control 
system. The online system facilitates identification services and outreach 
activities, which are provided in order to promote awareness of strategic 
76 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 31(1).
77 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 49.
78 Foreign Trade Act (note 26), Article 59(1)3.
79 Korea Strategic Trade Institute (note 22), p. 128
The South Korean Government has 
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improving its export control system
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items and export controls among companies and the academic community. 
The establishment of KOSTI is an example of how government can play a 
role as an implementing facilitator by raising awareness of export controls 
among exporting companies and by assisting the companies to increase their 
compliance capacities.
South Korea could refine its export control system by addressing three 
issues. First, it could consider resolving the possible conflict between the 
munitions list (Annex 3) and defence industry materials. While the former 
is defined by the Wassenaar Arrangement munitions list for 
non-proliferation purpose, the latter is categorized by DAPA 
for promotion of the national defence industry. The South 
Korean Government should consider merging the two lists 
in order to streamline arms export regulations. Second, 
it seems that the Council for Control of Exportation and Importation of 
Strategic Items does not provide much information on its tasks and issues. 
More transparency in the work of the council would enhance understanding 
of inter-agency coordination. Finally, effective enforcement is essential 
to achieve the goal of non-proliferation export control. To improve South 
Korea’s export controls, a study could delve into the function of customs 
officers and the role of prosecutors in this field.
Government can raise awareness of 
export controls and assist companies to 
increase their compliance capacities
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EU European Union
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KCS Korea Customs Service
KOSTI Korea Strategic Trade Institute
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
MOTIE Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSSC Nuclear Safety and Security Commission
WMD  Weapons of mass destruction
18 sipri background paper
RECENT SIPRI PUBLICATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND 
EXPORT CONTROL
SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security 
Oxford University Press, 2013 
Including ‘Export control regimes’, by Sibylle Bauer and Andrea Viski, and ‘Export 
control developments in the European Union’, by Sibylle Bauer and Mark Bromley
China’s Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 38 
Mark Bromley, Mathieu Duchâtel and Paul Holtom 
October 2013
Strengthening the European Union’s Future Approach to WMD 
Non-proliferation 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 37 
Ian Anthony and Lina Grip 
June 2013
The Proliferation Security Initiative: Legal Considerations and Operational 
Realities 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 36 
Aaron Dunne 
May 2013
Arms trade control capacity building: lessons from dual-use trade controls 
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2013/2 
Sibylle Bauer 
March 2013
Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Technical and Organizational 
Considerations 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 33 
Shannon N. Kile and Robert E. Kelley 
August 2012
Implementing an arms trade treaty: mapping assistance to strengthen arms 
transfer controls 
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2012/2 
Paul Holtom and Mark Bromley 
July 2012
Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 32 
Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks 
January 2012
Implementing an Arms Trade Treaty: Lessons on Reporting and Monitoring 
from Existing Mechanisms 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 28 
Paul Holtom and Mark Bromley 
July 2011
End-user certificates: improving standards to prevent diversion 
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2010/3 
Mark Bromley and Hugh Griffiths 
March 2010
 south korea’s export control system 19
The EU non-proliferation clause: a preliminary assessment 
SIPRI Background Paper 
Lina Grip 
Novmber 2009
Air Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows 
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 24 
Hugh Griffiths and Mark Bromley 
May 2009
Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods 
SIPRI Research Report no. 24 
Anna Wetter 
Oxford University Press, 2009
SIPRI publications are available to download or buy from <http://www.sipri.org/
publications/>.
SIPRI is an independent 
international institute 
dedicated to research into 
conflict, armaments, arms 
control and disarmament. 
Established in 1966, SIPRI 
provides data, analysis and 
recommendations, based on 
open sources, to policymakers, 
researchers, media and the 
interested public. 
GOVERNING BOARD
Göran Lennmarker, Chairman  
(Sweden)
Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar  
(Indonesia)
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky  
(Russia)
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi  
(Algeria)












 I. Introduction 1
 II. The development of export controls in South Korea 2
From the cold war to the 1990s 2
Recent developments 4
 III. Legal structure and control lists 6
Control lists of strategic items 6
Defence industry materials 7
 IV. Licensing 9
Major agencies 9
Groupings of destinations 10
Types of licence 11
 V. Enforcement 13
Customs authorities 13
Prosecutions, penalties and administrative measures 14
 VI. Conclusions 15
  Abbreviations 17
 Box 1. KOSTI and identification services 10
 Box 2. Situations listed in the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods and  12 
Technologies
 Table 1. South Korea’s export control system 8
Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00








Jaewon Lee (South Korea) was a SIPRI–Korea Foundation Intern with the SIPRI Dual-
use and Arms Trade Control Programme. He is a graduate of the Graduate School of 
International Studies at Seoul National University. He previously worked for a short 
period at the Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI). His research interests include 
nuclear policy and non-proliferation export control in North East Asia.
